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ABSTRACT 
Animals have moral status, and we have corresponding obligations 
to take their interests into account. I argue that Stakeholder Theory 
provides a moderate, yet principled way for businesses to do so. 
Animals ought to be treated as stakeholders given that they affect 
and are affected by the achievement of the objectives of the busi-
nesses in which they are involved. Stakeholder Theory therefore re-
quires taking those interests into account. It does not, however, re-
quire that they be given the same weight as human interests. By 
taking the stakeholder approach, businesses can avoid merely re-
acting to (rapidly increasing) public outcry over the treatment of 
animals. Even those who hold extreme positions—that businesses 
have no obligations to animals, or that animal products and ser-
vices are inherently immoral—can take the treatment of animals as 
stakeholders to provide an ethical realpolitik of sorts that is both bet-
ter for animals and better for business. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
R. Edward Freeman opened his (1984) Strategic Management: A Stakeholder 
Approach with a story about Bob Collingwood, the president and CEO of a 
large multinational corporation who was inundated with meetings with, 
and obligations to, a wide variety of groups—legislators, consumer inter-
ests, group, and unions among others. Bob was “headed for ‘stardom’” 
given his ability to handle individual crises, but felt unprepared and “knew 
 
1 This chapter grew out of discussions with Alex Howe, and I am indebted to him 
for many invaluable suggestions and comments. 
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that he needed a framework and a strategy for managing diversity and tur-
bulence, to get out of the crisis-reaction-crisis cycle” (p. 4). 
This description might feel familiar to managers whose businesses in 
some way make use of animals. The public have increasingly strong opin-
ions regarding the proper treatment of animals and the overall importance 
of animal welfare. This trend can be observed in the increased prominence 
of veganism and vegetarianism, the increased concern with “ethical meat,” 
the continued development of new generations of meat alternatives, sup-
port for process improvements in industrial meat production, opposition 
to cosmetic testing on animals, and increasingly vocal opposition to animal 
experimentation in general. The sheer scope of this trend of increased 
moral concern for animals has begun to impact how businesses success-
fully navigate the marketplace. 
These waters can feel particularly difficult to navigate given that “ani-
mal ethics” is most commonly associated with groups like People for the 
Ethical Treatment of Animals (PeTA), whose website bears the slogan, 
“Animals are not ours to eat, wear, experiment on, use for entertainment, 
or abuse in any other way,” and thinkers like Peter Singer, who argues that 
“speciesism” is on a par with racism and sexism (Singer 1975). These claims 
are extreme, and, while that in no way means they are wrong, it does mean 
that they provide little guidance for those wondering, “Can zoos be rede-
signed for a more ethical generation?” (Bennett 2018). The all-or-nothing 
approach commonly associated with “animal rights activism” is not tena-
ble for zookeepers, farmers, and managers of pharmaceutical companies. 
What is needed is a realpolitik for animal-business relationships—a frame-
work that is moderate, yet takes the interests of animals seriously. 
Freeman’s framework for the Bob Collingwoods of the world was 
Stakeholder Theory, on which managers treat the interests of employees, cus-
tomers, and other groups in the same way that they treat those of stock-
holders. This chapter proposes that the same framework can be applied to 
concerns about the interests of animals. Prima facie, this may seem implau-
sible given that all archetypical stakeholder groups, such as employees are 
humans, and animals are, well… not. The primary work of this chapter, 
therefore, is that of §3, which provides a theoretical basis for looking be-
yond such first appearances. After this, §4 considers some details of 
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treating animals as stakeholders, but first, §2 reviews the basic approach to 
Stakeholder Theory that is our starting point. 
2 (ETHICAL) STAKEHOLDER THEORY 
2.1 The stakeholder concept 
Use of ‘stakeholder’ as a term of art in business ethics stems from discus-
sions and work at the Stanford Research Institute in 1960’s.2 It was the 
1980’s, however, that saw Stakeholder Theory develop into its current form 
and become a major topic of discussion. Here, Freeman’s (1984) is the locus 
classicus,3 and it is his name that is most strongly associated with the ap-
proach. 
As implied by its title and illustrated by the Bob Collingwood story 
above, Freeman presented his book as providing a strategy, a way that “ex-
ecutives can begin to put their corporations back on the road to success” 
(p. vi). However, it is important both for understanding Freeman and for 
our current purposes to note that Stakeholder Theory is not simply a man-
agement strategy in the pragmatic sense. Despite his initial framing and 
elsewhere construing Stakeholder Theory as a theory of the corporation 
(Freeman, 2014), Freeman has been clear that the motivation for its devel-
opment was an ethical one. The problem, as Freeman later put it, was the 
prevalence of “the separation fallacy,” on which “sentences such as ‘x is a 
business decision’ have no ethical content or any implicit ethical point of 
view” (Freeman, et al. 2010, p. 6). This is surely not the case. Even apart 
from any moral obligation to obey the law, it would obviously be immoral 
for Coca-Cola to revert to a formula including cocaine given our 
knowledge of how harmful such a decision would be. While many busi-
ness decisions do not have such extreme and obvious ethical components, 
most have some such, at least in virtue of their potential to harm or benefit. 
 
2 A 1963 internal memorandum is usually cited as the first use. Jeffrey S. Harrison 
reports finding a use in (Silbert 1952), but it was not the source of later uses 
(Freeman, et al. 2010, p. 31, n. 3). 
3 Initial statements were given independently the year before in (Mitroff 1983) and 
(Freeman & Reed 1983). 
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To understand why Freeman developed the Stakeholder Theory in re-
sponse to this problem, it is helpful to look at the context in which the sep-
aration fallacy thrived. That context is perhaps best captured by Milton 
Friedman’s (in)famous 1970 article, “The Social Responsibility of Business 
is to Increase Its Profits” (Friedman 1970). There, Friedman argued for the 
titular thesis and against the idea that the managers of businesses have 
moral obligations to consumers, employees, or any other groups beyond 
their shareholders. Why think that managers do not have such obligations 
when making business decisions? Friedman gave several arguments, but 
at the foundation was the idea that a corporation is owned by its share-
holders and that the managers of that corporation are their agents. As 
agents of the shareholders, managers are obligated to act in their interests, 
not those of society at large.4 The interest that unifies shareholders is return 
on investment (at least if it is a for-profit corporation), and this means that 
managers have an obligation to pursue profit. Given that we only tend to 
view as ethical considerations those that are not directly self-interested, 
Friedman’s argument leads straightforwardly to the separation fallacy. 
While Friedman’s view has some prima facie plausibility, his description 
of the nature of corporations is on shaky ground. Shareholders do not own 
a corporation in the way that Mom and Pop own the General Store. What 
they own are shares that entitle them to dividends and give them certain 
rights (e.g. voting rights). The shareholder-manager employment relation-
ship therefore isn’t exactly like that of Mom and Pop to the clerk that they 
have hired. Neither is it a legal principal-agent relationship. Managers do 
have the legal obligations of a fiduciary, but these are weaker than those of 
an agent, permitting the sorts of pro-social activities Friedman rejects. In 
fact, as Freeman (2014) points out, obligations to several non-shareholder 
groups have been formalized by developments in corporate law, such as 
the doctrine of strict liability and the National Labor Relations Act. These 
developments impose legal obligations in tension with Friedman’s picture 
of the managerial role, but Freeman also argues that they indicate a societal 
understanding of the nature and purpose of business on which it is not an 
 
4 Though Friedman does say that managers have to follow the “rules of the game,” 
primarily abiding by the law and dealing honestly. 
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entity to be run solely for the benefit of shareholders. He contends that the 
stakeholder concept is extremely helpful for identifying these broader ob-
ligations. 
With this background, it is unsurprising that one of the earliest under-
standings of the stakeholder concept was as a generalization from the no-
tion of shareholders. There is universal agreement that managers do have 
significant obligations to shareholders. Why? Because the ownership of 
shares means that shareholders have a financial stake in the success of the 
firm. However, there are other groups of people who have a stake in the 
activities of a business as well—both financial and otherwise. Shareholding 
is therefore merely a particular type of stake-holding. Once we have dis-
missed the idea that the shareholders’ stakes given them more or less ab-
solute rights of ownership, then, by parity of reasoning, managers have 
obligations to other stakeholders as well when deciding how to run the 
firm. 
2.2 Basics of the stakeholder theory 
Who, then, is a stakeholder? We will look at specific proposals for 
stakeholder identification below. For now, we can note that the number 
and nature of stakeholder groups will vary depending on the nature of the 
organization, with a few groups generally agreed to be archetypical. In a 
diagram used to illustrate the basic stakeholder idea, Freeman identifies 
six groups—shareholders, customers, employees, the local community, 
suppliers, and the managers themselves.5 
 
 
5 Adapted from (Freeman, 2014). 
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Regardless of whether stakeholder theory perfectly captures the fun-
damental structure of corporations, it seems to do a good job of capturing 
the sorts of corporate relationships that determine the variety of obliga-
tions had by corporate managers in running the firm. Given that employ-
ees, suppliers, and others are vital to the corporation and have a vested 
interest in its activities, managers are obligated to take those interests into 
account when determining what those activities will be. Of course, those 
interests will sometimes conflict, but when they do the interests of no 
group (including the shareholders) automatically trump the interests of 
any other. 
This general approach of balancing identifiable interests is important 
for our purposes because it provides a decidedly non-radical framework 
for ethical decision-making in business. One way to see this is to note that 
it is compatible the “shareholder primacy norm,” on which managers’ fi-
duciary duty to act in the financial interests of the shareholders is very 
strong. Doing so, even in a manner that gives greater weight to these share-
holder interests than to others, will only conflict with the stakeholder ap-
proach if one interprets the shareholder rights as overriding, rendering fi-
nancial obligation to shareholders the sole duty of managers. 
This last point brings out an important feature of stakeholder theory. It 
does not, in and of itself, provide a strict decision procedure for corporate 
governance. Application of the theory requires it to be supplemented by 
balancing principles—what Freeman calls a “normative core” (Freeman, 
2014). Shareholder primacy is one such principle, but there are many other 
options as well. For instance, Freeman mentions the possibility of taking a 
Rawlsian approach on which one strives for equality of stakeholder inter-
est satisfaction, and requires that inequalities benefit the group that is least 
well off. 
Stakeholder theory’s incompleteness is actually an advantage with re-
spect to providing a non-radical approach to ethical decision making, es-
pecially when it comes to controversial topics like animal ethics. As noted 
above, the extremely strong normative commitments of folks like Singer 
and the members of PeTA are simply non-starters for many businesses. 
Similar problems can arise with respect to more traditional stakeholder 
groups as well, but on stakeholder theory, so long as a manager recognizes 
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the nature of stakeholder relationships and interest-obligations, they can 
look to their own or common societal ethical commitments to provide bal-
ancing principles. Assuming these are reasonable, the result will be a rea-
sonable decision-making framework whose ethical guidance the manager 
will be willing to accept. 
2.3 Stakeholder theory at work: An example 
SC Johnson provided a good example of stakeholder-based decision mak-
ing in 2004 when they decided to change the formula for their food storage 
film Saran Wrap. At the time, Saran Wrap held an 18% market share due 
to superiority over competitors with respect to microwavability and 
providing an odor barrier. These advantages were conferred by polyvinyl-
idene chloride (PVDC), which is at least somewhat chemically related to 
polyvinyl chloride (PVC). When concerns arose about the safety and envi-
ronmental impact of PVC, SC Johnson reevaluated their use of PVDC as 
well. Despite the fact that PVDC did not pose as significant a threat as PVC 
and was not as liable to future ban or regulation, the company decided to 
remove the chemical. With it went Saran Wrap’s competitive advantage 
and over a third of its market share. 
Given this not-insignificant reduction in profit, it is clear that changing 
the Saran Wrap formula was not in the financial interests of the SC Johnson 
shareholders. In a 2015 Harvard Business Review article, CEO Fisk Johnson 
explained the basis for the company’s decision to nevertheless remove 
PVDC. 
Although most decisions are a matter of trade-offs and evolving prior-
ities, one priority doesn’t change for us: acting in the best interests of 
our customers… we go out of our way to act with care. When it comes 
to the safety of our ingredients, we prefer to err on the side of caution. 
(Johnson 2015) 
While he doesn’t talk in terms of stakeholders, it is easy to translate John-
son’s comments into those terms. When it came time to decide what action 
to take with respect to PVDC, the health and safety interests of the cus-
tomer stakeholder group were deemed to outweigh the financial interests 
8 
 
of the shareholder stakeholder group. Importantly, this is not because the 
latter are thrown out the window. SC Johnson does not pull every chemical 
about which there is any remote safety concern, and even in the case of 
PVDC the company held off for a year while attempting (unsuccessfully, it 
turned out) to develop a safer alternative with the same properties. Rather, 
“when it comes to the safety of our ingredients, we prefer to err on the side 
of caution” can be read as a basic balancing principle: Treat customer safety 
as significantly weightier than financial concerns. That is a fairly specific prin-
ciple, but it is given while discussing a specific case. A more general prin-
ciple in the same spirit might be: Physical health and safety concerns are sig-
nificantly weightier than financial concerns. Such a principle would also help 
guide the balancing of employee-shareholder interests in cases where sig-
nificant improvements to production machinery would improve worker 
safety, and of customer-employee interests when deciding whether to 
lower the price of a product by having employees work overtime to in-
crease supply. 
3 PARTICIPATING ANIMALS AS FULL STAKEHOLDERS 
3.1 Clarifying the question 
The promise of Stakeholder Theory as a moderate-but-principled decision-
making framework can be seen in the extensive literature that has devel-
oped around it in the last 35 years. However, in all that literature the ap-
proach has never been applied to animal interests. Presumably this is be-
cause animals cannot express their interests and voluntarily participate in 
business relationships the way that the humans of traditional stakeholder 
groups can. True, the relationship of a dairy farm to its cows differs greatly 
from SC Johnson’s relationship to its customers. But are those differences 
relevant to stakeholdership? That is the central question of this section. Or, 
more generally, it is whether on the stakeholder approach there is a theo-
retical basis for treating animals as stakeholders. Two clarifications of this 
question are in order. 
First, we are asking about the animals themselves. On any application 
of Stakeholder Theory a poultry producer has an obligation to minimize 
disease among its chickens. On current construals, however, this in fact an 
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obligation to human stakeholder groups—the customers who might get 
sick, the stockholders whose shares might lose value due to negative pub-
licity, etc. What concerns us is whether the chickens constitute a separate 
stakeholder group such that the company has a direct obligation to them to 
minimize disease. 
The second clarification is that we are focused on what we can call par-
ticipating animals. These are animals that bear a direct relation to a com-
pany’s production of goods or services. In addition to the chickens above, 
these include, for instance, the mice of a research laboratory, cheetahs of a 
zoo, and cows of a dairy farm. The pollution produced by an automobile 
factory might have significant effects on animals wild and domestic, near 
and far. However, these animals play no role in its production of vehicles, 
and we need take no position on whether they are part of a distinct stake-
holder group or their interests incorporated into those of, say, the local 
community. 
Thus clarified, our central question is: Is there a theoretical basis for treat-
ing the participating animals of an organization as an independent stakeholder 
group of that organization? While theorists have not addressed this question 
directly, they have addressed the question of stakeholder identification more 
generally—who counts and on what basis? The Saran Wrap case above was 
fairly straightforward in that it concerned archetypical stakeholders, but 
managers must often contend with other groups whose status is not so 
clear, including activists, governments, and the media. Let’s consider some 
prominent answers to this general question before considering their appli-
cation to non-humans in general, and participating animals in particular. 
3.2 Two-tiered identification and full stakeholders 
Even two decades ago, Ronald Mitchell, et al. were able to identify over 
two dozen glosses or definitions on ‘stakeholder’ extant, with six distinct 
rationales (1997, pp. 858, 60-61). However, the two primary themes among 
these were already captured by Freeman and Reed’s initial article in their 
distinction between the wide and narrow senses of ‘stakeholder’. Here is 
how they define each (1983, p. 91).  
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The Wide Sense of Stakeholder: Any identifiable group or individual who 
can affect the achievement of an organization’s objectives or who is 
affected by achievement of the organization’s objectives. 
The Narrow Sense of Stakeholder: Any identifiable group or individual 
on which the organization is dependent for its continued survival. 
Freeman and Reed’s wide definition has two aspects. The candidate 
group (we can treat individuals as “groups” of one) must be identifiable and 
connected (causally) to the achievement of the organization’s goals. The 
connection requirement is straightforward. An isolated indigenous people 
group in the Amazon is not a stakeholder in Uber since if, say, Uber has 
the objective of expanding to the 1,000 most populous U.S. cities, their suc-
cess will neither affect nor be affected by the indigenous Amazonians. This 
clarity can help in disambiguating “identifiable”—this requirement should 
be seen as a qualification on the group’s causal connection. The collection 
of Uber’s potential customers whose social security number ends in 42 con-
stitutes an “identifiable” group in some sense, but surely not in the right 
sense. Wide-stakeholder groups must be “identifiable” in that their mem-
bers share some property that determines how they are connected to 
achievement of the organizational goals. 
The wide definition carves out an important concept—a fundamental 
feature of the firm-shareholder relationship is that each significantly affects 
the other, so this ought to be true of stakeholders as well. However, causal 
connection is too permissive a criterion to be very helpful. Any corporation 
that emits carbon has at least some effect on every living thing, but it is not 
the case that all God’s creatures got shareholder-analogous relationships 
with that corporation. The narrow definition, naturally enough, narrows 
down stakeholders, and it does this by requiring a high level of significance 
for the causal connection. Namely, it must be so significant that if it were 
absent or strongly negative, the organization would not survive.6 
 
6 Presumably, would not survive in its present form—customers would still be nar-
row stakeholders of a dairy farm even if, on losing them, the farm could convert 
to producing beef instead. 
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Such two-tiered approaches are extremely common. For instance, Max 
Clarkson (1995) all but exactly mirrors Freeman and Reed’s narrow/wide 
classification in distinguishing primary and secondary stakeholders. Em-
ployees, customers, suppliers, etc. are primary stakeholders because with-
out their “continuing participation the corporation cannot survive as a go-
ing concern” (p. 106). In addition (as we shall see), even some more com-
plex approaches to stakeholdership yield a similar distinction. One worry 
here is that the definitions of wide/secondary stakeholders are so inclusive 
as to threaten the usefulness of Stakeholder Theory as a practical frame-
work. It’s not clear that our obligations to those who can affect or be af-
fected by us are anything less than our ethical obligations simpliciter. It is 
therefore an important clarification of our central question that it concerns 
stakeholdership of the top-tier. At the risk of over-multiplying terminol-
ogy, we can say that when a stakeholder group bears the sort of relation-
ship to the firm that carries with it the sorts of obligations had toward the 
archetypical stakeholder groups they are full stakeholders, and note that this 
is the sort of stakeholdership at issue in our central question. 
3.3 The Primary Challenge to non-human stakeholders 
On standard two-tiered approaches it is easy to make the case for taking 
participating animals to be full stakeholders. Consider our milk cows 
again. If they ceased producing usable milk, then obviously the dairy farm 
would not survive. Furthermore, this connection to the farm’s success is 
due to a property—producing the raw product—that clearly identifies the 
cows as a distinct group. 
Why, then, have participating animals not been treated as stakeholders 
when they clearly meet the criteria above? Since they have not even been 
considered as candidates there is no literature that directly addresses the 
question. However, there is a literature on a different potential non-human 
stakeholder. In his (1995) article, Mark Starik asked the same question 
about the natural environment. Two aspects of his answer to why it had not 
been considered a stakeholder apply to animals as well. One concerns 
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human advocacy, and the other concerns the focus and framing of Stake-
holder Theory.7 
The human advocacy part of the answer is that non-human interests 
are captured indirectly through the human stakeholders who take those 
interests on as part of their own. If customers demand that businesses re-
spect the environment, then there seems to be no need to consider the en-
vironment per se as a separate stakeholder. 
This is clearly insufficient on its own to show that the environment 
should not be considered a stakeholder. Customers also advocate for em-
ployees when they boycott companies that use child labor, but this obvi-
ously does not mean that we should not take there to be an independent 
employee stakeholder group. Yet Starik’s response is also insufficient on 
its own to establish the environment as a stakeholder. He correctly points 
out that greater changes are needed than those thus far achieved via human 
advocacy. But this observation is just as compatible with a call for better 
advocacy or increased corporate responsiveness to it as it is with a call for 
something (stakeholdership) beyond advocacy. 
The second part of the answer given by Starik is that Stakeholder The-
ory design and discussion is focused on humans.8 As noted in §2, Stake-
holder Theory is often connected to the notion of Corporate Social Respon-
sibility. If it is social in nature, then presumably it concerns only humans. 
This focus is surely reinforced by the simple fact that much of our ethical 
deliberation, and certainly the majority of corporate deliberation, concerns 
interpersonal relationships. This framing and focus results in something 
like an implicit “Condition.” A group must be composed of members of 
society for a dependency relationship (or what have you) to place them in 
the stakeholder category. 
 
7 Not only is “The exclusion of non-human nature from the business environment” not 
relevant to our discussion of animal stakeholdership, but it is odd that Starik 
includes it at all. Plausibly, if it is part of the business environment, the natural 
environment would be excluded from stakeholdership. The business environ-
ment is the context in which business occurs—the playing field rather than a 
separate player. 
8 Here we convert, “’Stakeholder’ status has been restricted to humans only,” to a reason 
for withholding stakeholder status by combining it with “The ‘stakeholder’ idea 
has been exclusively a political-economic concept” (1995, pp. 207-209). 
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We needn’t get into the details of Starik’s response to this considera-
tion, however, his identification of this issue is important, as it points to 
what seems to be the primary challenge to conferring stakeholder status on 
non-humans, including participating animals: they lack the agency or abil-
ity necessary to participate in the stakeholder relationship in the way that 
humans can and do. Stakeholder Theory was developed from analogies to 
intentional actors: a gambler puts up a stake; a stockholder invests in a com-
pany. Likewise, a supplier signs a contract, an employee earns a wage, and 
a customer buys a product. In performing these acts, stakeholders exhibit 
agency. When cows are milked, chickens are butchered, and cheetahs are dis-
played, these acts are not intentional, and the animals do not thereby exhibit 
agency. 
Here is the challenge in argument form. 
PRIMARY CHALLENGE 
(1) A group is a candidate stakeholder of an organization only if its 
members’ participation in their relationship with that organiza-
tion is intentional 
(2) No non-human entities participate in their relationship with an 
organization intentionally 
(3) Therefore, no non-human entities can be stakeholders in any or-
ganization 
The Primary Challenge is deductively valid, so if we are to resist the 
conclusion, we must find fault with one or more premises. There is a plau-
sible reading of (2) on which it is certainly correct. One of the best candi-
dates for a counterexample would be the capuchins that were the subjects 
of research by the Yale economist Keith Chen.9 These monkeys were taught 
to use money by being allowed to exchange metal discs for foods that they 
liked to differing degrees and, later, choosing whether to gamble with their 
discs. (Infamously, after one threw an entire tray of discs into the testing 
chamber, the monkeys were observed exchanging “money” for sex.) In 
making decisions about what to do with their discs, Chen’s capuchins 
 
9 Stephen J. Dubner and Steven D. Levitt reported on Chen’s research in the New 
York Times (2005). 
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actively participated in his research, but they did not do so intentionally. 
The monkeys did not have the capacity to understand that their decision 
making was part of an experiment. So, while they intentionally chose to 
make purchases or gambles, they did not intentionally participate in the re-
search. 
Given that something similar will be true of all non-human animals, (2) 
seems secure. The crucial premise then, and the one that we should reject, 
is (1), which makes intentional participation a requirement on stakeholder 
candidacy. Call this the Agency Condition. 
There is a quick objection to (1). If we are thinking of Stakeholder The-
ory simply as a prudential decision-making framework, then perhaps the 
Agency Condition is plausible. But we are focused on Stakeholder Theory 
as an ethical framework. Our ethical concerns extend beyond our obliga-
tions to those with whom we have intentional interaction as equals. We 
have, therefore, some reason to reject that condition. 
This objection is far from decisive. The reason given, while significant, 
is only prima facie. Ethical Stakeholder Theory is not a full-fledged norma-
tive ethical system, meant to capture all moral considerations. It is a practi-
cal ethic, meant to provide moral guidance of a particular sort for business 
practices. It is not implausible that this practical nature of Stakeholder The-
ory could support the Agency Condition. That it does is made more plau-
sible by the fact that the condition makes explicit an intuition likely to be 
widely shared, even among those who take businesses to have serious eth-
ical obligations to animals or the environment. If the condition is to stand, 
however, it needs some further theoretical basis. We now turn to two ac-
counts that potentially provide such grounding. 
3.4 Stakeholder Power and the Agency Condition 
Ronald Mitchell, Bradley Agle, and Donna Wood (1997) propose a some-
what complex account of stakeholdership on which there are seven distinct 
classes of stakeholders rather than two. These are derived from the possible 
combinations of three stakeholder attributes (pp. 865-867). 
Power: “a party to a relationship has power, to the extent that it has 
or can gain access to… means, to impose its will in the relationship” 
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Legitimacy: “loosely [refers] to socially accepted and expected struc-
tures or behaviors” 
Urgency: determined by “(1) time sensitivity…, and (2) criticality—
the importance of the claim or the relationship to the stakeholder” 
Mitchell, et al. identify their theory as one of both stakeholder identifi-
cation and salience— “The degree to which managers give priority to com-
peting stakeholder claims” (p. 869). Our present concern is only with the 
former, so we need not detail all seven of their stakeholder classes. What 
we want are those who are full stakeholders. Possibly this is only “Defini-
tive Stakeholders”—those with all three attributes. However, because Ur-
gency is primarily related to salience, we will take those with only Power 
and Legitimacy (“Dominant Stakeholders”) to be full stakeholders as well. 
Given our focus on ethical stakeholder theory, we are only interested in 
groups with legitimate ethical claims. 
Our simplifications yield a sort of ad hoc-two-tiered account where all 
stakeholders have Legitimacy, but only those with Power are full stake-
holders. However, it does not judge non-humans to be full stakeholders, 
unlike the two-tiered accounts above. This is because the Power require-
ment supports the Agency Condition, given the authors’ explication of that 
attribute as concerning the ability to impose one’s will in a relationship. On 
a natural understanding, imposing one’s will requires that one act with the 
intention to bring about what one wills to be the case. Thus, agency is re-
quired for Power, which is in turn required for full stakeholdership, and 
non-humans are excluded.10 
3.5 Against the Power requirement 
Mitchell, et al. obviously do not employ the notion of full stakeholdership 
and it is far from clear that they would endorse the above reasoning even 
if they took that notion and our simplifications on board. However, what 
 
10 In their original taxonomy, Mitchell, et al. classify the natural environment as a 
“Dependent Stakeholder,” as it does not have Power itself, but relies on the ad-
vocacy of humans. 
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matters for our purposes is that their machinery could be appealed to as a 
ground for the Agency Condition as in the manner suggested. 
It could be, but should not be.  Child labor provides a potent counter-
example to the idea of Power as a requirement for full stakeholdership. 
Children working in clothing factories have no Power, but they neverthe-
less constitute an archetypical stakeholder group: employees. Such cases 
are multiplied by the strong notion of Power as the ability to impose one’s 
will. Take employees who are unable to unionize, or customers deprived 
of options by competition avoidance. Their circumstances often create 
power imbalances so great as to make it, for all intents and purposes, im-
possible to impose their will on the corporation. 
A primary feature of ethical Stakeholder Theory is that it provides a 
framework on which ethical obligations are not ignored, even when the 
relevant group cannot effectively demand that those obligations be met. 
So, even though Power is certainly an important contributor to salience, it 
is not relevant to stakeholder identification, and it therefore does not sup-
port the Agency Condition. 
3.6 Rawlsian fairness and the agency condition 
The above response to the Power proposal indicates that the Agency Con-
dition would require a normative grounding. It must be that intentional 
participation is necessary for a relationship to carry the practical ethical 
obligations of Stakeholder Theory. Such a ground is provided by Robert 
Phillips and Joel Reichart in their arguments against environmental stake-
holdership (2000). Their rejection of Starik’s environmental stakeholder 
proposal, discussed above, is along lines that we have suggested.  They 
argue that, as a practical ethic, Stakeholder Theory is not meant to address 
all normative considerations, so what is needed (but not provided by 
Starik) is an account of stakeholder identification that determines which 
considerations fall under its scope. Here they endorse a Rawlsian fairness-
based approach previously developed by Phillips (1997). 
We can (roughly) put Phillips’ account in the language we have been 
using as follows. The normative core of the account says that managers 
must deal fairly in discharging their moral obligations to the firm’s various 
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stakeholders. The notion of obligation in play is a technical one, and its 
details constrain the sort of relationships that determine whether a group 
is a stakeholder (and therefore a full stakeholder).11 The relevant features 
are that an obligation is owed by a specific person(s) to a specific person(s) 
in virtue of some voluntary act or omission (2000, p. 186). 
Phillips and Reichart are explicit that their use of ‘person’ excludes 
non-humans. But the account would provide a theoretical basis for the 
Agency Condition even if we ignored this, as acts that are voluntary are, a 
fortiori, intentional. Non-humans cannot voluntarily, intentionally accept 
benefits and cooperate in the ways that Phillips and Reichart argue gener-
ate a specific obligation for businesses for the same reasons that Chen’s 
capuchins could not voluntarily, intentionally participate in his research.  
The relevant normative notion of fairness therefore provides a grounding 
for the Agency Condition, and neither the environment nor participating 
animals can be candidate stakeholders. 
3.7 (Partially) against the Rawlsian fairness approach 
One worry for Phillips and Reichart’s fairness approach is that the volun-
tariness requirement faces the same problems as did the Power require-
ment above. Child laborers are no more voluntary in their relationship 
with their employers than they are able to impose their will in that rela-
tionship, despite being archetypical stakeholders. It is perhaps unsurpris-
ing that Phillips and Reichart’s account faces a difficulty along these lines, 
given that one challenge to Rawls’ general account of justice is that it is an 
idealized theory, and as such, it is not clear that it can be straightforwardly 
applied to “the real world.” One might object that Rawls’ theory concerns 
justice per se and how to achieve real-world justice is a separate question, 
but this response is not available to Phillips and Reichart. The flipside of 
their reply to Starik that Stakeholder Theory is not a general normative 
 
11 On Phillips’ original presentation, his account is two-tiered, distinguishing be-
tween stakeholders who have normative legitimacy and those who have derivative 
legitimacy (1997, pp. 124-130). (Phillips & Reichart 2000) forgoes this distinction, 
and it is not particularly relevant for our purposes given that it is the normative 
legitimacy groups we would count as full stakeholders and it is just these groups 
to whom the Rawlsian fairness considerations apply on the account. 
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ethic is that as a practical ethic it must be applicable to the world as it cur-
rently is. 
One move that is open to Phillips and Reichart is to take it that 
Rawlsian fairness considerations apply directly in proper stakeholder rela-
tionships, but in deviant ones the considerations are counterfactual. In 
other words, managers of a clothing company ought to take into consider-
ation obligations that would be generated by their child laborers if it were 
the case that the voluntariness condition were met.12 
Presumably such obligations would still apply only to persons, not to 
non-humans. However, if we abandon a strictly Rawlsian normative core, 
then it is not clear that there is a strong basis for maintaining the person-
hood requirement. Indeed, the counterfactual approach gives us a princi-
pled way to abandon it. We can ask what obligations would be incurred 
were relationships with the relevant non-humans to support the right kind 
of obligations.13 
This approach has, I think, a significant benefit. One of the primary ad-
vantages of Stakeholder Theory is compatibility with a variety of norma-
tive cores, but Phillips and Reichart’s original Rawlsian core constrained 
the sorts of groups that are candidates for stakeholdership. The extended 
counterfactual version, on the other hand, allows for a normative core that 
is still based on at least a Rawls-inspired notion of fairness without dictat-
ing constraints on stakeholdership. 
3.8 The Operational Patient Condition 
We have been looking for a proper theoretical grounding for the Agency 
Condition. Since we are concerned with ethical Stakeholder Theory, such 
a grounding would have to be ethical in nature. This eliminates one class 
of proposals—those such as the Power condition that are based on deci-
sion-specific concerns like salience. The condition cannot have the ethical 
grounds of a rejection of the moral relevance of animals, since—in addition 
 
12 Indeed, such a move might fit well with the general Rawlsian idea of advance-
ment in justice by approximation of the idealized picture presented. 
13 Technically, this question is likely to concern a counterpossible conditional. This 
does not make a relevant difference, however, since we routinely reason with 
counterpossibles, and in the same way we reason with standard counterfactuals. 
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to being highly controversial, the nature of our project assumes that ani-
mals are morally relevant. A natural place to look for an ethical grounding 
would be in a normative core. As we saw with the Rawlsian fairness ap-
proach, however, this means giving up on a major contributor to the prac-
ticality of the ethics of Stakeholder Theory, compatibility with a variety of 
(reasonable) normative commitments. 
The reason for our theoretical grounding search was that intentional 
participation is prima facie irrelevant to an ethical theory. Finding none, we 
reject the Agency Condition and the Primary Challenge of which it was a 
premise. This does not automatically mean that participating animals, 
wildlife, or the environment count as stakeholders though. Critics are cor-
rect that, as stated, traditional two-tiered theories are insufficient. Suppose 
that some of the factories of Futuron, Inc. rely on complex, autonomous 
robots that (we can stipulate) lack sentience. These robots constitute an 
identifiable group on whom the business depends, yet, intuitively, they are 
not stakeholders. Traditional theories have left things at this intuitive level, 
but in evaluating contentious cases, we need an explicit Condition that tells 
us why such a business has an employee stakeholder group, but not a robot 
stakeholder group. More precisely, ethical Stakeholder Theory needs an 
ethical Condition. 
The broadest condition that will do the job simply distinguishes the 
ethical realm from the non-ethical. Call it the Moral Relevance Condition. 
Suppose that the managers of Futuron are considering whether to move 
one of their factories to a state with lower taxes. The moral considerations 
(including any beyond stakeholder obligations) are the same whether the 
factory in question does or does not have robots. The robots are morally 
irrelevant, and thus are not candidates for stakeholdership. 
The Moral Relevance Condition is too broad, however. On at least some 
moral theories, many objects are morally relevant in virtue of having in-
trinsic value. Beauty and historical importance are commonly cited sources 
for such value. But while Rembrandt drawings and Parthenon marble may 
be morally relevant, they are no more stakeholders in the British Museum 
than our robots are stakeholders in Futuron. 
For a narrower condition, we might take a cue from earlier discussion 
in which we have sometimes said that Stakeholder Theory involves 
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balancing stakeholder interests. Taken as a commitment (rather than a con-
venient turn of phrase), such statements imply a Morally Relevant Interests 
Condition. Such a condition would admit archetypical stakeholder groups, 
while excluding robots, Rembrandts, and ruins, none of which have inter-
ests of any sort. 
The Morally Relevant Interests Condition is an improvement on the 
Moral Relevance Condition, but one problem it faces is that it is less neutral 
than is desirable. While reference to interests does not entail any particular 
normative core, it is at least in tension with those that are not consequen-
tialist. 
A more neutral possibility comes by way of a contrast with the notion 
of agency with which we began: moral patiency. A Moral Patiency Condition 
would maintain the benefits of the Morally Relevant Interests Condition, 
while improving on neutrality.  Unfortunately, both conditions face the 
further problem that they are too inclusive. Consider a hacker collective 
that decides to hold a tech startup hostage by threatening to release pro-
prietary information. If they do so, the startup will lose its competitive ad-
vantage and be driven out of business by larger, more established corpo-
rations. The hackers are moral patients, but they are surely not full stake-
holders in the startup. The startup may depend on the collective for their 
continued existence, but not, it seems, in the right way. 
What is the right way? It is tempting to return to something like the 
voluntariness requirement of the fairness approach, since the startup was 
forced into their dependency relationship with the hackers. However, we 
have seen that, for example, some relevant employee-firm relationships are 
non-voluntary. The difference between such employee-firm relationships 
and that of the hackers to the startup is that the former is a business rela-
tionship. Having employees is a normal, necessary part of being a tech 
startup; being held hostage by hackers is not. 
With this last distinction we have arrived at what I take to be a robust 




OPERATIONAL PATIENT CONDITION 
A group is a candidate stakeholder of an organization only if its 
members are moral patients and their relationship to the organiza-
tion is part of the normal course of its operations. 
“Relationship” here should be construed broadly. Futuron has a rela-
tionship with its robots. In fact, that relationship is part of the normal op-
erations of Futuron, since those include the operation of factories that rely 
on the robots. However, the robots are not moral patients, and they are 
therefore not stakeholders in Futuron. This moral patiency requirement 
also means that Rembrandts, ruins, and other “merely” intrinsically valu-
able objects do not count as stakeholders. Our hacker collective meets this 
requirement, but are excluded from stakeholdership because their relation-
ship to the tech startup is not part of that business’ normal operations. In 
contrast, all of our archetypical stakeholders “count.” Shareholders, man-
agers, suppliers, employees, local communities, and customers are all 
moral patients, and all of their relationships with a firm are part of normal 
business operations.  
The Operational Patient Condition, then, captures the intuitive data at 
least as well as the Agency Condition. But, unlike the latter, it has a clear 
theoretical basis. The moral patiency requirement captures the ethical na-
ture of ethical Stakeholder Theory, and does so in a way that is broad 
enough to maintain normative neutrality. The normal operations require-
ment, on the other hand, captures the practical ethical nature of ethical 
Stakeholder Theory. That theory was developed to provide an ethical 
framework for business decisions, and therefore it is entirely appropriate 
that stakeholdership should be reserved for those groups who are nor-
mally relevant to such decisions.14 
  
 
14 “Normal” should not be taken to imply “frequent.” The problem with the 
hacker-startup relationship is its nature, not its rarity. 
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3.8 Participating animals as full stakeholders 
Making explicit the features we have discussed, and using the language 
from Freeman and Reed’s particular two-tiered approach, yields the fol-
lowing full stakeholder definition. 
FULL STAKEHOLDER 
Group G is a full stakeholder of organization O just when G com-
prises moral patients who share a relation to O such that in the nor-
mal course of its operations O depends on G for its continued sur-
vival in virtue of that relation 
On this account of stakeholder identification, some participating ani-
mals are indeed full stakeholders. Consider Chen’s capuchins again. They 
are identifiable as a group in virtue of a specific relationship to the organi-
zation in question—they are the lab’s research subjects. We cannot, morally 
speaking, do whatever we please to monkeys, so the members of this iden-
tifiable group are moral patients. Obviously, without research subjects 
there would be no research lab, so the organization depends on the capu-
chins for its survival. And, finally, this dependency relationship between 
subject and researcher is part of the normal course of operations for the lab. 
The capuchins are not a special case, since the same sorts of considera-
tions apply to a wide variety of participating animals. There are some bor-
derline cases, to be sure. While the denizens of a zoo’s primate house are 
full stakeholders in the zoo, it is not certain that the same can be said for 
fish in its aquarium given that their moral patiency is up for debate. It is 
sufficient for our purposes, however, that on Stakeholder Theory some an-
imals count. This means that when zookeepers, heads of research labs, or 
CEO’s of leather goods companies make organizational decisions, they 
must take into account their obligations to participating animals alongside 
those owed to their employees, customers, and shareholders. The next sec-
tion considers what this might look like, and how it might fulfill the prom-




4 CONSIDERING ANIMAL STAKEHOLDERS 
4.1 The general upshot and a metaphor 
While compatibility with a range of normative cores has been touted above 
as an advantage of Stakeholder Theory, one might worry that it also un-
dermines the theory’s ability to provide practical guidance. We have seen 
that on a highly plausible construal of stakeholdership some animals are 
stakeholders in some organizations, but what exactly does this mean for 
the managers of such organizations? 
As a start, we can say that it means that they obligated to take into ac-
count the interests of animals alongside those of shareholders, customers, 
and other stakeholder groups in their decision-making. This upshot is gen-
eral indeed, but its importance should not be underestimated. The general 
stakeholder approach that has been taken up by managers and corpora-
tions, not only theoreticians. This is evident in the ubiquity of stakeholder 
language in mission and vision statements, and Freeman, et al. give scenario 
planning and generation of strategic alternatives as two further areas of man-
agement that have been strongly influenced (2010, pp. 106-108). While 
Freeman (1984), Harrison and St. John (1994), and others have offered spe-
cific, stakeholder-based management tools, it is doubtful that these de-
tailed proposals are primarily responsible for corporate uptake. On its 
own, the shift from seeing employees, suppliers, etc. as subjects of a share-
holder king to members of a stakeholder family was a significant develop-
ment. This history bodes well for a similar shift from seeing participating 
animals as rented mules to beloved pets. 
This pet metaphor is chosen deliberately. It isn’t within the scope of this 
chapter to develop animal-specific addenda to the stakeholder manage-
ment tools of Freeman or Harrison and St. John (nor would there be space 
to do so). We can, however, identify at least a few specific details of animal 
stakeholder management beyond general consideration of interests, and 
the metaphor is helpful in doing so. Pets are participating animals in the 
organizations of our families. Their participation is non-voluntarily; we 
adopt them for our own purposes, which they never understand, much less 
intend to fulfill. When we do so, we take on certain obligations them—we 
are morally required to consider their interests. What does that look like? 
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4.2 Obligation to investigate interests 
At the most fundamental level, this looks like providing basic care. This 
includes the obvious redirection of financial resources from other family 
interests such as home projects to purchase food. But the obligation to care 
for our pets goes beyond avoiding negligence and abuse. The moral re-
quirement to consider their interests carries with it the obligation to be in-
formed as to what those interests are. At the very least, this is so for those 
who are aware that animals have interests beyond basic appetites and have 
the ability to learn about what those interests are. 
These criteria are certainly met by the managers of businesses with par-
ticipating animals, and they therefore have an obligation to be informed 
about the interests of those animals. This may seem an obvious point, but 
it is particularly worth making given the emphasis in the stakeholder liter-
atures (and management literature more broadly) on two-way relation-
ships. This emphasis might lead one to suppose that animals cannot be 
stakeholders since they cannot participate in the communication required 
for such relationships. However, within the context of Stakeholder Theory, 
the primary function of such two-way interactions is the communication 
of stakeholder interests to decision-makers. It is sufficient for animal stake-
holdership that animals do have morally relevant interests, and that those 
can be discovered. 
Indeed, a good deal has already been discovered about the interests of 
participating animals. Perhaps the most well-known example is the work 
of Temple Grandin, who has identified multiple aspects of livestock han-
dling that significantly affect behavior.15 The adoption by beef plants of her 
double rail system for restraining cattle for stunning is a clear illustration 
that one need not be an animal rights activist to take seriously the interests 
of animals.16 Treating animals as stakeholders codifies the role of those in-
terests in business and clarifies the obligation to seek out the work of those 
like Grandin who identify those interests and how they can be promoted. 
  
 
15 E.g. (Grandin 1980) and (Grandin 1997). 
16 See (Grandin 2003), as well as her initial description in (Grandin 1988). 
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4.3 Interactions with other stakeholder interests 
Grandin’s work is also an example of how, as with other stakeholder 
groups, considering animal interests can be good for business. Were this 
always and obviously the case, then there would be little need for Stake-
holder Theory in the first place. Unfortunately, it is not, either in general 
or with respect to animals in particular. Let’s call on our pet metaphor 
again to think about the relationship of animals and other stakeholders. 
First, to note what animal stakeholdership does not imply. 
At least in the West, pets are routinely talked of as members of the fam-
ily, and we often go to great lengths in caring for them, even sacrificing 
significant interests of the human family members if the need arises. Nev-
ertheless, there are limits. Certainly, we would find it perverse to delay 
non-emergency medical treatment for a parent in favor of veterinary care, 
and most of us would not consider providing even toys for a dog over a 
daughter. Treating animals as stakeholders needn’t (and most often won’t) 
mean giving their interests the same status as those of human stakeholder 
groups anymore than adopting a pet means giving it the status of an 
adopted child. This is not the theoretical departure it might initially seem. 
Recall that we have already seen that Stakeholder Theory does not require 
treating all stakeholder groups the same. As noted in §2, the approach is 
compatible with the doctrine of shareholder primacy, and it is also per-
fectly compatible with respecting animals as moral patients to treat their 
interests as less morally weighty than those of humans.17 
Still, animal interests matter, and an important feature of animal stake-
holdership is that their interests matter independently of the interests of hu-
man stakeholder groups. Suppose that a family is deciding between taking 
a camping trip or a vacation at a theme park. Camping will allow the fam-
ily’s dog Otis to remain with the family and enjoy a host of new experiences 
whereas the theme park will mean a weak of (very mild) distress from ken-
neling. The family ought to consider Otis’ interests, and therefore, ceteris 
 
17 Of course, Stakeholder Theory does not require such differential treatment ei-
ther. However, it is unlikely that the Peter Singers of the world will find them-
selves directing companies with many participating animals. 
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paribus, ought to choose camping.18 This is true even if part of the reason 
that Mother wants to go camping is for Otis’ sake. The interests of Otis and 
Mother are reinforcing, not redundant. 
In the same way, the interests of animal stakeholders are not redundant 
to animal-directed interests of consumers. Independent consideration of 
stakeholder groups means that businesses have more reason to respond to 
customer concerns related to participating animals than they do many oth-
ers.19 This point is particularly worth emphasizing given the tendency in 
the stakeholder literature (including this chapter) to appeal to the financial 
benefits of the stakeholder approach. Too great a focus on these can give 
the impression that the market can be relied on to indicate when stakehold-
ers’ interests have been appropriately taken into account. Suppose that 
consumers express worries about the size and arrangement of cages for 
chickens at a poultry plant. It might be that minor improvements are suffi-
cient to maximize profits by mollifying those concerns enough to prevent 
consumer defection without greatly increasing poultry prices. These minor 
changes may nevertheless be ethically insufficient given that improve-
ments are in the interests of multiple stakeholder groups, not the customers 
only. 
4.4 A special case: forbidden stakeholders 
Treating animals as stakeholders requires taking their interests into ac-
count independent of their alignment with the interests of other stake-
holder groups. This does not require ignoring conflicting interests of hu-
man stakeholder groups or even treating the interests of animal stakehold-
ers as equally weighty. However, it is worth noting a special case in which 
their interests do trump those of human stakeholder groups. 
Above, we saw the relevance of the interests of Otis to its family’s 
choice of vacation. What should we say if instead of Otis the dog, the family 
had a pet tiger? Well, we should say “Don’t keep a tiger as a pet!” Even 
 
18 Lest this sound unintuitively strong, we should keep in mind that rarely will all 
things be perfectly equal. 
19 It is worth noting that this issue is underrecognized with respect to Stakeholder 
Theory in general. Similar points can be made regarding, say, customer advo-
cacy for living wages or improved working conditions for employees. 
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setting aside the obvious safety and legal issues, the life of a pet is not the 
life for a tiger. As much as the family may love and strive to care for it, they 
will never be able to sufficiently take the tiger’s interests into account. Ti-
gers are “forbidden pets,” not in the sense that it is illegal or impossible to 
keep one as a pet, but in the sense that it is impossible to do so ethically. 
There are cases in which it is likewise impossible to ethically maintain 
animal participation, and such animals are forbidden stakeholders. Exotic an-
imals provide the best examples of forbidden animal stakeholders as well 
as forbidden pets. Zoos are the businesses that are perhaps most clearly 
and consistently concerned with the interests of their participating ani-
mals. As we have learned more about what those interests are, however, it 
has become increasingly clear that for some large mammals this concern is 
not enough. In 2016, the marine mammal park SeaWorld announced that 
it would cease captive breeding of killer in response to increasing public 
outcry. Critics of the park can be read as arguing that killer whales are for-
bidden stakeholders given that they that travel up to 100 miles a day in 
their natural habitat.20 Elephants provide a less extreme example. Research 
indicates that significant social structure and opportunity for foraging be-
havior are vital to the well-being the pachyderms (Meehan, Mench, 
Carlstead, & Hogan 2016). Not all zoos are able to provide these necessities; 
for such zoos, elephants are forbidden stakeholders. 
4.5 A worry: forbidden stakeholders and fatal participation 
The notion of forbidden stakeholders throws into sharp relief an issue that 
this chapter has largely avoided until now—cases in which animals’ par-
ticipation entails their death.21 I have been arguing that Stakeholder Theory 
provides a moderate-but-principled approach to treating animals ethically 
because it requires that businesses take their participating animals’ inter-
ests into account. But surely survival is the most fundamental interest of 
every (healthy) creature. Shouldn’t, therefore, all animals be forbidden 
stakeholders for businesses that produce meat, leather goods, and the like? 
 
20 Though SeaWorld denies that the animals’ well-being is affected by not swim-
ming large distances. (CNN 2013). 
21 Thanks to Natalie Evans for suggesting that I address this issue more directly. 
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Perhaps, but not necessarily. 
A stakeholder approach requires that the interests of participating ani-
mals be taken into account, but not that they always trump the interests of 
other stakeholders. Animals are forbidden stakeholders for a business 
when it is impossible for that business to take their interests into account 
in any significant way given the participation that they require. It is cer-
tainly true that being slaughtered for meat is not in a cow’s interest, but the 
abattoir is not the only point of participation for beef cattle. Their entire 
lives are participation. Therefore, it is possible to take their interests into 
account in a significant way by, for instance, applying the work of Temple 
Grandin.22 Such possibilities mean that beef cattle are not forbidden stake-
holders. This is in contrast to the case of elephants above. These animals 
participate by living their elephantine lives on display for the education 
and entertainment of the zoo’s customers. If the zoo lacks the resources to 
provide the foraging and socializing opportunities necessary for signifi-
cant well-being during those lives, then the zoo is unable to take the inter-
ests of those elephants into account in any significant way. 
Importantly, the above is not an argument for the permissibility of fatal 
participation. It is only meant to show that the stakeholder approach 
out20lined in this chapter is not incompatible with such. However, endors-
ing a stakeholder approach does not require being sanguine about the kill-
ing of animals for food, clothing, or what have you. The determining factor 
is the normative core with which one fleshes out that approach. On some 
normative cores, survival interests of any stakeholder group will always 
trump any non-survival stakeholder interests. Again, I take Stakeholder 
Theory’s compatibility with a variety of normative cores to be a virtue, and 
a primary reason for considering it a “moderate” approach to addressing 
issues of animal ethics in business. But normative cores are not all created 
equal. Those who hold such killings to be always immoral can and should 
reject normative cores that permit fatal participation, and attempt to con-
vince others to do so as well. 
  
 




Stakeholder Theory provides a framework for businesses to take seriously 
their moral obligations to animals without adopting an all-or-nothing 
mindset. Animals may seem out of place alongside stakeholder groups 
such as customers, employees and shareholders, but that is only because 
of our tendency to focus on the agency of stakeholders. What matters is not 
agency, but operational (moral) patiency. Many, if not most, animals that 
are vital to the continued success of the organizations in which they partic-
ipate meet this condition, and those organizations ought to consider the 
interests of their animals alongside those of other stakeholder groups. 
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